SUMMARY: This rule requires certain commuter operators that now conduct 
operations under part 135 to conduct those operations under part 121. 
The commuter operators affected are those conducting scheduled 
passenger-carrying operations in airplanes that have passenger-seating 
configurations of 10 to 30 seats (excluding any crewmember seat) and 
those conducting scheduled passenger-carrying operations in turbojet 
airplanes regardless of seating configuration. The rule revises the 
requirements concerning operating certificates and operations 
specifications for all part 121, 125, and 135 certificate holders. The 
rule also requires certain management officials for all certificate 
holders under parts 121 and 135. The rule is intended to increase 
safety in scheduled passenger-carrying operations and to clarify, 
update, and consolidate the certification and operations requirements 
for persons who transport passengers or property by air for 
compensation or hire.

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 19, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alberta Brown, (202) 267-8321; 
Katherine Hakala, (202) 267-8166; or Dave Catey, (202) 267-8166; 
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW, 
Washington, DC 20591.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Outline of Final Rule

I. Introduction
II. History
III. The Problem and Related FAA Action
    A. Accident Rate for Commuter Operations
    B. Public Perception
    C. Congressional Hearings
    D. NTSB Study
    E. Related FAA Action
IV. The Proposed Rule and General Description of Comments
V. Major Issues
    A. General Justification
    B. Applicability
    C. Aircraft Certification
    D. Flight Time Limits and Rest Requirements
    E. Age 60 Rule
    F. Dispatch System
    G. Airports
    H. Effective Date and Compliance Schedule
VI. Discussion of Specific Proposals
    A. Part 121 Discussion
    1. Subpart E--Approval of Routes: Domestic and Flag Air Carriers
    2. Subpart F--Approval of Routes: Approval of Areas and Routes 
for Supplemental Air Carriers and Commercial Operators
    3. Subpart G--Manual Requirements
    4. Subpart H--Airplane Requirements
    5. Subpart I--Airplane Performance Operating Limitations
    6. Subpart J--Special Airworthiness Requirements
    7. Subpart K--Instrument and Equipment Requirements
    8. Subpart L--Maintenance, Preventive Maintenance, and 
Alterations
    9. Subpart M--Airman and Crewmember Requirements
    10. Subpart N and O--Training Program and Crewmember 
Qualifications
    11. Subpart P--Aircraft Dispatcher Qualifications and Duty Time 
Limitations: Domestic and Flag Air Carriers
    12. Subparts Q, R, and S--Flight Time Limitations and Rest 
Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations
    13. Subpart T--Flight Operations
    14. Subpart U--Dispatching and Flight Release Rules
    15. Subpart V--Records and Reports
    B. Part 119-- Certification: Air Carriers and Commercial 
Operators
VII. Discussion of Comments Related to Costs and Benefits
VIII. Regulatory Evaluation Summary
IX. The Amendments

Background

I. Introduction

    On March 29, 1995, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on ``Commuter 
Operations and General Certification and Operations Requirements'' 
(Notice No. 95-5; 60 FR 16230.) In Notice 95-5, the FAA proposed that 
commuter operations conducted in airplanes with 10-30 passenger seats 
be conducted under the domestic or flag rules of part 121 of title 14 
of the Code of Federal Regulations. Currently, scheduled passenger-
carrying operations in airplanes with passenger-seating configurations 
of over 30 seats or more than 7,500 pounds payload capacity are 
conducted under part 121. Scheduled passenger-carrying operations in 
airplanes with passenger-seating configurations of 30 seats or less and 
7,500 pounds or less payload capacity are conducted under part 135. 
Part 121, which provides the safety requirements for all major air 
carriers (as well as for any certificate holder conducting scheduled or 
nonscheduled operations with airplanes configured with more than 30 
passenger seats), is generally considered to have more restrictive 
requirements than part 135. The regulatory changes were introduced in 
order to address the continually changing needs of the industry and to 
fulfill the agency's statutory requirement. This is the final rule, 
based on Notice 95-5.

II. History

    Historically, the maximum certificated takeoff weight (MCTW) of an 
airplane determined both an airplane's categorization and operating 
requirements. Beginning in 1953, airplanes with an MCTW of 12,500 
pounds or less were defined as ``small airplanes'' and were permitted 
to carry fewer than 10 passengers in on-demand air taxi service. The 
rules under which those operations were conducted were eventually 
codified as part 135. Airplanes with an MCTW of more than 12,500 pounds 
were defined as ``large airplanes,'' and most large airplanes carried 
20 or more passengers in scheduled air transportation. The Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) used the large/small dividing line to separate 
major airline companies, who were required to obtain a Certificate of 
Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) from the CAB in order to 
operate in interstate commerce as a common carrier, from on-demand air 
taxi operators, who were exempted from obtaining a CPCN.
    During this time, the CAB issued only a small number of CPCN's to 
major, publicly-recognized companies, such as Eastern, American, Delta, 
Pan Am, TWA, etc. In contrast, on-demand air taxi operators numbered in 
the thousands. These operators were typically fixed-base, usually at 
small airports, and owned fewer than five airplanes. They provided on-
demand air transportation as well as other services, such as training 
new pilots and selling and renting small airplanes. Typically, the air 
taxi portion of such an operator's business was a small part of that 
business and rarely involved any scheduled operations.
    Beginning in the late 1960's, airplane manufacturers began to 
design and build small airplanes, that is, less than 12,500 pounds 
maximum certified takeoff weight, that were capable of carrying more 
than 10 passengers, often close to 20. Some air taxi operators began to 
offer services that resembled the services of the major airlines, given the economic opportunity to 
operate under the less restrictive requirements of part 135. Though 
these scheduled commuter operators began to overtake some air taxi 
operations, they still remained a small percent of the thousands of air 
taxi operators.
    In 1978, as a result of the Airline Deregulation Act, the airline 
industry was deregulated economically and air carriers were given more 
freedom to enter and exit markets without prior government economic 
approval. One of the most significant effects of this deregulation was 
that it allowed major carriers to eliminate service to smaller 
communities, where such service proved to be uneconomical for the large 
aircraft the carriers operated. Major carriers were replaced in those 
communities by the commuter carriers. Under this ``hub and spoke'' 
system, the major part 121 air carriers provided service to the large 
metropolitan airports, while the growing class of scheduled part 135 
air carriers provided service between smaller communities as well as 
feeder service from the smaller communities to the larger cities to 
connect with the major carriers' operations. With these changes, the 
traditional two categories of operations became three categories of 
operations--scheduled commuter operations, traditional air taxis, and 
traditional major air carriers.
    Also in 1978, in response to the Airline Deregulation Act, the FAA 
reissued part 135 standards to upgrade commuter and air taxi safety 
requirements and make them more like part 121. At that time part 135 
certificate holders were required to meet more stringent requirements 
in several areas, including weather reporting, flightcrew training, 
maintenance, and qualifications for management personnel.
    Since 1978, the FAA has issued a number of separate rule changes to 
further align part 135 safety requirements with those in part 121. 
Despite this realignment, differences between the regulations still 
exist. The economic incentive to operate under part 135 still exists 
because the requirements in part 135 are still less restrictive than 
the part 121 requirements in many instances.
    For the remainder of this document the following terms are used in 
the following ways. ``Commuter,'' ``commuter airline,'' and ``commuter 
operator'' mean those operators conducting scheduled passenger-carrying 
operations under part 135 in airplanes with a passenger-seating 
capacity of 30 or fewer seats. This current use of the word 
``commuter'' does not include scheduled passenger-carrying operations 
conducted under part 121 in airplanes with a seating capacity of 31 to 
60 seats. The term ``commuter category airplane'' used in this document 
refers to airplanes type certificated in that category under part 23 in 
contrast to airplanes type certificated under part 25 which are 
transport category airplanes. The term ``nontransport category 
airplanes'' is used for commuter category airplanes and SFAR 41 and 
predecessor normal category airplanes to be operated under part 121, as 
well as for some older airplanes certificated before the predecessors 
of part 25 (parts 04 and 4b of the Civil Air Regulations) came into 
existence. The Department of Transportation (DOT) uses the term 
``commuter'' more broadly to include all scheduled passenger-carrying 
operations conducted in airplanes with a passenger-seating capacity of 
20 to 60 seats. (Note: The High Density Rule, 14 CFR part 93 uses 
``scheduled commuters'' differently. Its meaning under that part is not 
relevant to its use in this document.) The term ``regional,'' which is 
used by industry to refer to short-haul, passenger-carrying, scheduled 
operations conducted under part 121 or part 135, is not generally used 
by the FAA.

III. The Problem and Related FAA Action

    Recent part 135 commuter accidents have focused public, government, 
and industry attention on the safety of commuter operations. While the 
safety level of part 135 commuter operations has continued to improve, 
accident data, public perception, and recent government inquiries show 
a need for additional measures.

III.A. Accident Rate for Commuter Operations

    The airline industry that uses airplanes with a passenger-seating 
capacity of 60 or fewer seats to conduct scheduled operations under 
parts 121 and 135 is an essential part of the air transportation 
network in the U.S. These airlines now fly more than all airlines did 
in 1958. In 1993, over 50 million passengers, 12 percent of the total 
passenger flights in the country, were flown by these airlines. Half of 
these passengers were flown in part 135 operations, i.e., in aircraft 
with 30 or fewer seats.
    Over the past two decades the safety record of part 135 commuters 
has greatly improved. The accident rate per 100,000 departures in 1993 
was one-fourth the accident rate in 1980. However, the accident rate 
for commuter airlines operating under part 135 continues to be higher 
than the rate for domestic part 121 airlines. In the past 2 years, 
several commuter airline accidents occurred that attracted media and 
public attention and caused government and industry officials to 
scrutinize the safety system for commuter operations under part 135.
    These accidents included the December 1, 1993, crash of a Jetstream 
3100, operated by Express II (as Northwest Airlink), at Hibbing, MN; 
the January 7, 1994, crash of a Jetstream 4100, operated by Atlantic 
Coast Airlines (as United Express), at Columbus, OH; and the December 
13, 1994, crash of a Jetstream 3200, operated by Flagship Airlines (as 
American Eagle), at Raleigh-Durham, NC. All of these accidents involved 
fatalities.

III.B. Public Perception

    With the increase in the number of flights to many communities 
conducted in airplanes with a seating capacity of 30 seats or less, 
some members of the public are questioning whether they are receiving 
an appropriate level of safety in small propeller-driven airplanes 
compared to the level of safety they receive in larger aircraft. This 
public concern is partly a result of the integration of commuter 
carriers with major airlines under an arrangement known as code-
sharing. The term ``code-sharing'' refers to the computerized airline 
reservation system that lists a commuter flight in the reservation 
system under the same code used by a major carrier. A passenger who 
books with a major carrier may have a leg of the flight automatically 
booked with a smaller commuter affiliate of the major carrier.
    With the media attention to recent commuter accidents, the 
passenger may also believe that the flight involves more risk because 
the smaller airplane and its operation may not have to meet the same 
safety standards. Most passengers probably do not realize that some 
differences in standards are necessary because of differences in the 
airplane and operation and that some of the accidents that are 
categorized by the media as ``commuter'' accidents occurred in flights 
that were being conducted under part 121; that is, in airplanes with 
over 30 passenger seats.
    The differences in regulations were initially based on differences 
in the types of operations and differences in the size of airplanes; 
these differences in many instances still apply. But other differences, 
such as certain performance and equipment requirements, operational control requirements, and passenger information 
requirements are not size- or operationally-based. Some differences 
between the two sets of regulations must be maintained while others can 
be eliminated to improve the safety of commuter operations.

III.C. Congressional Hearings

    On February 9, 1994, Congress held hearings on the adequacy of 
commuter airline safety regulations. The purpose of the hearings was to 
determine if FAA safety regulations should be modified to establish a 
single standard for all scheduled operations regardless of airplane 
size. Representatives of government, industry, and the public presented 
testimony. Most testimony supported the upgrading of safety 
requirements.

III.D. NTSB Study

    In November 1994, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
published a study on commuter airline safety. (National Transportation 
Safety Board Safety Study: Commuter Airline Safety, NTSB/SS-94/02.) The 
study was based on the NTSB's analysis of accident investigations and 
previous studies, on a recent site survey of airline operations and 
policies conducted at a representative sample of commuter airlines, and 
on information obtained from a public forum on commuter airline safety 
convened by the NTSB.
    In the study, the NTSB found that the commuter air carrier industry 
has experienced major growth in passenger traffic and changes in its 
operating characteristics since the NTSB's 1980 study of the commuter 
airline industry. The NTSB found that there has been a trend in the 
industry toward operating larger, more sophisticated aircraft, and many 
carriers have established code-sharing arrangements with major 
airlines. The NTSB concluded that the regulations contained in 14 CFR 
part 135 have not kept pace with changes in the industry.
    As a result of the findings, the NTSB issued the following safety 
recommendations to the FAA:
     Revise the Federal Aviation Regulations such that all 
scheduled passenger service conducted in aircraft with 20 or more 
passenger seats would be conducted in accordance with the provisions of 
14 CFR part 121. (A-94-191)
     Revise the Federal Aviation Regulations such that all 
scheduled passenger service conducted in aircraft with 10 to 19 
passenger seats would be conducted in accordance with 14 CFR part 121, 
or its functional equivalent, wherever possible. (A-94-192)
    In the 1994 study, the NTSB examined the differences in flight 
dispatch requirements between parts 121 and 135. The NTSB found that, 
in the absence of support from licensed dispatch personnel, it is 
difficult for a part 135 pilot to accomplish several tasks between 
flights in the short periods of time available. The lack of support 
might increase the risk of critical mistakes that could jeopardize the 
safety of flight. As a result the NTSB issued the following 
recommendation to the FAA:
    Require principal operations inspectors (POI) to periodically 
review air carrier flight operations policies and practices concerning 
pilot tasks performed between flights to ensure that carriers provide 
pilots with adequate resources (such as time and personnel) to 
accomplish those tasks. (A-94-193) The FAA published all of the NTSB 
recommendations in the Federal Register (59 FR 63185, December 7, 1994) 
and received public comments generally supporting the expansion of the 
operational rules of part 121, except for flight time limitations, to 
commuter operations under part 135. Some commenters had considerable 
reservations about applying certain part 121 equipment requirements to 
smaller airplanes. The FAA considered these comments in developing this 
rule.

III.E. Related FAA Action

    In December 1994, the FAA proposed revisions to the training and 
qualification requirements of certificate holders conducting commuter 
operations under part 135. The proposed rule also addressed crew 
resource management training for pilots, dispatchers, and flight 
attendants in part 121. (59 FR 64272, December 13, 1994) [Add Final 
Action]

IV. The Proposed Rule and General Description of Comments

    In Notice 95-5, the FAA proposed to require that all scheduled 
passenger-carrying operations in airplanes with a passenger-seating 
configuration of 10 or more seats (excluding any crewmember seat) and 
all scheduled operations in turbojets (regardless of the number of 
seats) must be conducted under part 121. The proposal would require 
certificate holders now conducting scheduled passenger-carrying 
operations under part 135 in airplanes with a passenger-seating 
configuration (excluding any crewmember seat) of 10 to 30 seats or in 
turbojets to be recertificated and to conduct the applicable operations 
in compliance with part 121 requirements. In some instances the 
proposed rule revised the requirements of part 121 to make compliance 
with the requirements feasible for operations in smaller, nontransport 
category airplanes.
    In response to Notice 95-5, the FAA has received over 3,000 
comments from the public. Of these, most are solely on the issue of the 
Age 60 Rule. Many of the Age 60 commenters are pilots and other 
individuals who address the current rule in part 121; very few address 
the specific Age 60 issue contained in this rulemaking, i.e. the 
applicability of the Age 60 Rule to pilots of affected commuter 
airplanes. These comments are summarized in Section V.E., The Age 60 
Rule.
    Approximately 200 comments were received on the substantive issues 
raised by Notice 95-5. These commenters represent air carriers; 
manufacturers; associations representing air carriers, manufacturers, 
pilots, dispatchers, and passengers; State and local governments; the 
U.S. Small Business Administration; the National Transportation Safety 
Board; and individuals. While some commenters voice general support for 
the goals of Notice 95-5, most raise concerns about specific proposals. 
Industry commenters are particularly concerned about the costs of 
complying with the proposed rule.
    The FAA also conducted three public meetings on the proposed rule: 
on May 18, 1995, in Anchorage, Alaska; on June 14, 1995, in Chicago, 
Illinois; and on June 21, 1995, in Las Vegas, Nevada. Testimony from 
the public meetings and written statements submitted at the meetings 
have been included in the FAA public docket, have been considered by 
the FAA in developing the final rule, and are discussed in the 
following discussion of comments along with all written comments that 
were submitted to the FAA docket.
    In Notice 95-5, the FAA identified major issues that the agency 
addressed in developing the proposal. These included applicability of 
the proposal, aircraft certification issues, flight time limits, the 
Age 60 Rule, use of a dispatch system, certain equipment items, and the 
compliance schedule. Comments received on these major issues and the 
FAA's response to these comments are discussed in Section V. Comments 
received on specific proposals and the FAA's response to these comments 
are discussed in Section VI. Comments specifically addressing cost 
issues are discussed in Section VII. Below is a list of some of the 
major commenters and their associated abbreviations. The full name of 
each commenter is used when the commenter is first mentioned. In subsequent discussions, the commenter's abbreviation, as shown below, 
is used.

Abbreviations for Commenters

AAAE  American Association of Airport Executives
AACA  Alaska Air Carriers Association
ADF  Airline Dispatchers Federation
AIA  Aerospace Industries Association
ALPA  Air Line Pilots Association
APA  Allied Pilots Association
ASA  Atlantic Southeast Airlines
GAMA  General Aviation Manufacturers Association
HAI  Helicopter Association International
IAPA  International Airline Passengers Association
NACA  National Air Carrier Association
NATA  National Air Transportation Association
NTSB  National Transportation Safety Board
Penair  Peninsula Airways
RAA  Regional Airlines Association

V. Major Issues

V.A. General Justification

    In Notice 95-5, the FAA justified the proposed rule on the basis of 
the higher accident rate for commuter airlines. Parts of the proposed 
rule were also supported by the testimony from Congressional hearings 
on commuter airline safety regulations and by the NTSB study, based on 
accident investigations and previous studies, which found that part 135 
regulations had not kept pace with changes in the industry.
    Comments: The NTSB and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) 
generally support the proposal and its justification. A comment from 
the International Airline Passengers Association (IAPA) supports the 
rulemaking justification by stating the findings of a recently 
completed IAPA study of commuter/regional airplane safety records in 
the United States covering the period 1970 through March 31, 1994. 
According to IAPA, during that period carriers using airplanes with 30 
or fewer seats had 29 fatal accidents with 249 passenger fatalities; 
over 30 seat regional carriers had 1 fatal accident with 2 passenger 
fatalities; major airlines had 11 fatal domestic jet accidents with 527 
passenger fatalities.
    In contrast to these comments, many other commenters state that the 
proposed rulemaking lacked sufficient justification. Recent accident 
data, say these commenters, have shown significant reductions in 
accident rates for commuters so that the difference in accident rates 
for part 121 operations and part 135 commuter operations is minimal. 
According to at least one of these commenters, if the accidents that 
occurred in extreme environments such as Alaska are removed, the 
accident rate under the two parts would be either the same or lower for 
part 135 commuter operations.
    According to some commenters, the recent accidents cited in Notice 
95-5 were all caused by pilot error and thus would not have been 
prevented by this rulemaking but could have been prevented by 
improvements in training.
    Some commenters state that the proposed rule is the result of 
public, media, and agency overreaction to recent commuter accidents and 
that both the public and the media drew inaccurate conclusions about 
commuter airline safety from these accidents. According to these 
commenters, instead of hastily proposing rules based on incomplete 
information, the agency should have informed the public that many so-
called commuter operations are already being conducted under part 121.
    Several commenters state that the proposed rule will decrease 
safety because in order to avoid the proposed restrictions, certificate 
holders now operating airplanes with a seating capacity of 10 to 19 
passenger seats will switch to reciprocating-powered airplanes with a 
passenger seating capacity of 9 or less in order to continue to operate 
under part 135. Furthermore, some commenters state that if fares are 
significantly increased to pay for the more restrictive requirements, 
passengers may choose ground transportation, which has a much higher 
accident rate.
    Several commenters state that the proposed rule would have a 
significant economic impact on small airline operators, in some cases 
forcing them to close their businesses, thus eliminating air 
transportation to some locations. In addition, according to some 
commenters, the proposed rule would have a negative impact on 
competition, particularly in the foreign market because the cost of 
U.S. manufactured airplanes would increase.
    FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with the assessment that the 
proposed rule lacked sufficient justification. The FAA recognizes the 
validity of some of these comments especially in regard to unintended 
safety decrements if the aircraft performance portions of the proposed 
rule were adopted on the schedule proposed. While the FAA recognizes 
the improvements in the accident data for commuter airlines in recent 
years, it intends through this rulemaking, and other related rulemaking 
actions underway, to reduce the accident rate even further.
    Several commenters have questioned the need for a rule that would 
move affected commuters into part 121 domestic or flag operations. For 
instance two commenters argue that a dispatch system would not have 
prevented the three accidents cited by the FAA in the NPRM. It would be 
a mistake to assume that the FAA is basing this final rule on just 
those three accidents. Similarly, it would be a mistake to conclude 
that the FAA is justifying this rule on merely ``perceptions'' of a 
problem. Those accidents were catalysts for the Government to focus on 
the differences in the part 121 accident rate and the accident rate for 
10- to 30-seat part 135 commuters. Over the next 15 years affected 
commuters are expected to have had 67 more accidents than they would 
have had if the accident rate for part 135 affected commuters were the 
same as that for part 121 scheduled operators. The FAA believes that 
adoption of this rule will significantly close the accident rate gap 
over time.
    The FAA believes that the part 121 regulatory scheme for scheduled 
operations is more appropriate for the 10- to 30-seat scheduled 
operations. The added safety features and requirements in part 121 
domestic/flag rules, including the dispatcher system, will increase 
safety for the affected commuters. Because most accidents are caused by 
human errors, rules such as the part 121 training rules and the 
dispatcher system rules are some of the most valuable tools in reducing 
the number of these kinds of accidents. Rules that most directly relate 
to preventing accidents caused by human errors are being imposed on the 
affected commuters on a faster schedule than many of the other rules 
(e.g., aircraft performance and certain equipment retrofits). It can be 
reasonably anticipated that applying part 121 operating rules, 
including these two groups of rules, can begin to immediately and 
significantly reduce the accident rate for affected commuters. For 
instance, the FAA anticipates that requiring operators to have someone 
(i.e., a certificated dispatcher) double check the work of the pilot 
and provide the flight crew with updates on weather and alternate 
airports can reduce some human factor errors. The FAA believes that if 
the flight crew is subjected to more stringent flight and duty 
safeguards (either the current part 121 domestic flight and duty rules 
or the rules in a soon to be issued NPRM in which the FAA will propose 
to overhaul all the flight and duty regulations), the dangers of 
fatigue causing a human factors error will be reduced. Enhanced part 
121 training (which is being required of affected commuters in an associated final rule) will also reduce some 
human factor errors.
    It is critically important to impose the bulk of the part 121 
regulatory scheme on affected commuters because the absence of any 
significant portion of that regulatory scheme may lessen the 
effectiveness of the rest of the safety features in the part 121 
regulatory scheme. Even the best trained and well rested pilot is a 
human being and, therefore, subject to making errors. With a dispatcher 
system, the chances of pilot miscalculations or oversights could be 
reduced. Moreover, a dispatcher can assist the flight crew in making 
enroute plans for an alternate airport (which might be necessary due to 
weather problems, air traffic control problems, airplane equipment 
problems, fuel problems, etc.) while the crew focuses on flying the 
airplane. It is reasonable to conclude that the accident rate for 
affected commuters can be reduced to a level closer to that of current 
part 121 domestic operations by eliminating most of the regulatory 
differences that the two different regulatory schemes allowed.
    While major air carriers may require commuter affiliates to follow 
certain part 121 standards, and in some cases even exceed some part 121 
standards, no part 135 commuter operator currently operates under part 
121 operations specifications or totally complies with all part 121 
standards (e.g., many part 121 requirements are based on the assumption 
that transport category airplanes are operated). Most importantly, no 
part 135 commuter is required by current FAA regulation to comply with 
part 121 requirements.
    Recent accidents brought to public attention the differences 
between part 135 and part 121 and the lack of continuing justification 
for these differences. As Notice 95-5 pointed out, the distinction 
between these two types of operations was, in the beginning, an obvious 
necessity. Major air carriers engaged in public transportation were 
entirely different from the small on-demand, air taxi operator. But 
with the development and growth of what has come to be known as 
commuter service, the line between the two has blurred. Certain 
segments of the commuter industry have continued to develop commuter 
category airplanes, holding the line at 19 passenger seats in order to 
stay within the limits of the less restrictive airworthiness 
regulations for nontransport category aircraft. This has created the 
potential for the further development of commuter airplanes 
specifically designed to stay within the limits of the less restrictive 
regulations while at the same time becoming as sophisticated or more 
sophisticated in technology than some transport category airplanes 
operated by the major carriers. With hindsight, the FAA may not have 
drawn the line as it currently is but would have attempted from the 
start to maintain one set of requirements.
    Until now the line between the requirements has not created a 
safety concern, but as the commuter market grows, the disparity between 
the two sets of requirements is of more concern. There is no longer any 
justification for maintaining two sets of standards for scheduled 
operations in airplanes with a passenger-seating configuration of 10 or 
more seats. When a passenger pays for a ticket on an FAA certificated 
commuter operation, that passenger must be assured of the highest 
possible level of safety.
    With respect to commenters concerns that the proposed rules will 
actually decrease safety because certificate holders will switch to 
reciprocating-powered airplanes, the FAA has modified the proposal, 
especially in regard to the schedule for some airplanes to meet part 
121 airplane performance criteria, to allow operators sufficient time 
to build up capital or credit to make changes to the existing fleet or 
to purchase new airplanes that meet the higher performance standards. 
The FAA does not want to move so fast as to force operators to use 
airplanes that have even higher accident rates (i.e., airplanes with 9 
or fewer seats).
    The FAA finds that safety and the public interest require extending 
the proposed compliance dates for imposing part 121 performance 
criteria requirements and some equipment requirements until it is 
economically feasible for operators of 10- to 19-seat airplanes to 
acquire or lease replacement aircraft. The FAA has analyzed the 
situation and has concluded that many operators of 10-15 seat aircraft 
would replace those aircraft with 9 or fewer seat aircraft to avoid the 
sudden imposition of large costs on their current fleets. Without the 
FAA modifying its proposal with regard to airplane performance 
requirements, many airplanes would be eliminated from scheduled service 
at the first compliance date (i.e., 15 months after publication of the 
final rule) and operators of other airplanes would have to offload 
passenger seats, thereby causing the economic and safety impacts 
discussed previously. This modification would be consistent with the 
National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) recommendation for 
airplanes with 10- to 19-seats in scheduled service. For those 
aircraft, the NTSB recommended that scheduled passenger service be 
conducted in accordance with part 121 ``* * * or its functional 
equivalent, wherever possible''.
    Clearly the NTSB used the phrase ``wherever possible'' because it 
knew that it was not possible for a substantial portion of the 10- to 
19-seat airplane fleet to meet all of the requirements of part 121. The 
NTSB carefully chose its words when it made its recommendations for 10-
19 seat airplanes used in scheduled service. The NTSB recognized that 
the FAA necessarily had to exercise judgment about which part 121 
regulations to impose, which regulations could be modified to achieve 
functional equivalency, and which regulations simply might not be 
possible.
    In regard to comments that higher fares resulting from this 
rulemaking will cause passengers to switch to less safe modes of 
transportation, it has been the FAA's observation that passengers are 
usually willing to pay for safety. While some may choose to drive 
rather than fly, that has not stopped the airlines in the past from 
raising fares. It should also be noted here that the public tolerates a 
higher accident rate for automobile travel than for airplane travel. If 
air transportation accident rates approached that of ground travel, 
most Americans would stop flying. The air transportation industry is 
very aware of this; it is the main reason that air transportation is 
safe. As one commenter points out, the recent commuter accidents caused 
a 12 percent drop in passengers on commuter airlines. That is a 
significant cost to industry.
    The FAA has carefully considered the economic impact of the 
proposed regulations and has reviewed and revised its analysis in light 
of the comments received. (See Section VIII.) The agency has determined 
that the impact of the final rule should not disrupt air transportation 
service and that few, if any, certificate holders will discontinue 
their commuter operations. During the transition period, the FAA will 
work with certificate holders who are switching to part 121 
requirements to make the switch as smooth as possible. It should also 
be noted that the compliance schedule provides for a gradual updating 
of equipment and operations and will allow certificate holders the 
choice of upgrading or phasing out airplanes that cannot be upgraded 
without significant cost.
    Some may argue that there may still be limited circumstances, even 
with these changes, where the effects of this rule (and related 
rulemakings on upgraded training requirements and pilot flight time and duty 
limitations) will be so burdensome as to lead to adverse safety 
consequences and/or a loss of critical air service. This is neither 
FAA's intention nor its expectation. Indeed, the entire premise of this 
rulemaking is that safety standards can and must be improved for the 
benefit of passengers in 10-30 passenger seat aircraft in scheduled 
service.
    Nevertheless, there is in place in 14 CFR 11.25 a process for 
requesting and granting exemptions from regulatory requirements, 
including those adopted here. As with any request for exemption, of 
course, an applicant would have to demonstrate that the public interest 
justifies such an exemption. In this case, an applicant could show, for 
example, that it is unable to comply with a particular provision or a 
particular schedule date due to circumstances beyond its reasonable 
control (rather than its own failure to act in a timely or prudent 
manner), that there is convincing evidence that alternative service is 
unavailable to the public, and that the carrier would be able to 
maintain an adequate level of safety during the period of the requested 
exemption.
    We would expect that any exemption from this rule would be for a 
limited period only, such as the time required for delivery of a piece 
of equipment that has been ordered. Our goal would be to permit the air 
carrier to come into compliance with the rule in an orderly manner, and 
not simply to delay or avoid the cost of compliance.
    The FAA considers this rulemaking a positive step towards promoting 
air transportation by renewing confidence in commuter operations. Most 
importantly, this rulemaking should reduce the accident rate of the 
affected commuters to a rate that is closer to that of current part 121 
domestic operators.
    This rulemaking is consistent with the FAA's obligation in 
accordance with section 44701(d) of Title 49 of the U.S. Code that when 
prescribing a regulation or standard to promote safety or to establish 
minimum safety standards, the Administrator shall consider the duty of 
an air carrier to provide service with the highest possible degree of 
safety in the public interest. The intent of this rulemaking is to 
provide the highest possible degree of safety to affected commuter 
operations.

V.B. Applicability

    The FAA proposed that part 121 requirements would apply to all 
scheduled passenger-carrying operations for compensation or hire in 
airplanes with a passenger-seating configuration of 10 or more seats 
and to all scheduled passenger-carrying operations for compensation or 
hire in turbojet-powered airplanes regardless of seating capacity. 
(Throughout the rest of this document these certificate holders are 
referred to as the ``affected certificate holders'' or the ``affected 
commuters.'') Under the proposal, scheduled passenger-carrying 
operations in non-turbojet airplanes with 9 or fewer passenger seats, 
on-demand operations with airplanes with 30 or fewer passenger seats, 
operations in single-engine airplanes, and operations in rotorcraft 
would continue to be under part 135.
    The proposed rule would also have eliminated the frequency of 
operations test of five round trips per week which allowed some part 
135 scheduled operations to be conducted under the on-demand rules of 
part 135.
    Comments: While no commenters specifically object to applying part 
121 requirements to commuter operations in airplanes of 20 to 30 
passenger seats, several commenters, many of them small part 135 
certificate holders, object to applying part 121 requirements to 
commuter operations in airplanes of 10 to 19 passenger seats. According 
to these commenters, the FAA did not sufficiently justify imposing the 
more restrictive part 121 requirements on operations in these size 
airplanes and the small certificate holders of these airplanes would 
not be able to meet the economic burden of the proposal. A few 
certificate holders state that if the regulations are implemented as 
proposed they would either have to downgrade their airplanes, reduce 
the number of passenger seats, or terminate certain services. This is 
especially the case for small fixed-based certificate holders, who 
conduct mostly on-demand service with some scheduled service, and for 
certificate holders who service remote areas such as parts of Alaska, 
Hawaii, or the islands of Samoa.
    Commenters also state that the burden is greater for certificate 
holders not affiliated with a major airline and that drawing the line 
at 10 or more includes many small, independent certificate holders. 
According to commenters, these certificate holders provide a different 
kind of service from what the larger commuter operators provide.
    One commenter, IAPA, states that part 121 requirements should apply 
to all scheduled passenger-carrying operations, no matter how many 
seats are on the airplane. According to this commenter, by leaving out 
the under 10-seat aircraft from the rulemaking, passengers would be 
exposed to travel on the least safe aircraft operating in scheduled 
passenger transportation. According to the commenter, most under 10-
seat aircraft are piston-engined, with a lower level of engine 
reliability and performance. The aircraft are frequently operated in 
harsh environments thereby exposing passengers to higher risks.
    Many of the commenters who object to the applicability of part 121 
to aircraft with 10 to 19 passenger seats, also object to the 
definition of ``scheduled'' in proposed Sec. 119.3. According to these 
commenters, the effect of the current description in SFAR 38-2 of 
commuter air carriers that includes 5 round trips per week should not 
be changed. Apparently some small certificate holders that conduct 
mostly on-demand service also provide one or two scheduled service 
flights per week. According to these commenters, if they have to 
upgrade the airplanes and operations to part 121 to conduct these 
scheduled flights, they will downgrade the airplanes or terminate the 
service. The commenters state that they cannot afford to comply with 
part 121, that the service they provide offers one-of-a-kind service to 
remote places or resorts, and that in some instances there is no ground 
transportation to these locations.
    Several on-demand operators and the National Air Transportation 
Association (NATA) comment that the FAA should not revise part 135 on-
demand requirements either at this time or at any time. These 
commenters are responding to a statement in Notice 95-5 that additional 
standards for on-demand air taxi operations may be considered in the 
future.
    The General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) objects to 
including all scheduled passenger-carrying operations in turbojets 
under part 121 regardless of the number of passengers. While GAMA 
agrees with the FAA's assumption that no turbojets are being used in 
regularly scheduled part 135 operations, it objects to the 
applicability because the FAA presented no technical justification for 
the proposal. GAMA recommends allowing turbojets with a passenger-
seating capacity of 9 or less to operate under part 135. Aerospace 
Industries Association (AIA) also objects that no rationale was 
presented for including turbojets. AIA states that the proposed rule 
offers an unfair competitive advantage for normal category turboprops 
against jets with a passenger-seating capacity of 9 or less. United 
West Airlines states that it is a small operation with two jets, that 
it costs $70,000 a year to train its four pilots, and that the proposed 
rule will put the airline out of business. Two individual commenters recommend that ``any scheduled operation 
with airplanes seating more than 9 passengers but less than 19 
passengers'' be operated under supplemental rules when that scheduled 
operation is a code-sharing arrangement with another part 121 scheduled 
carrier.
    FAA Response: The so-called ``frequency of operation'' provision in 
the SFAR 38-2 definition of commuter air carrier does not exist for 
current part 121 operations. Affected commuters being upgraded to part 
121 by this rule will be required to conduct all of their scheduled 
operations under part 121 regardless of the number of scheduled 
operations. However, the FAA has decided to retain the frequency of 
operations distinction for those operations conducted in airplanes with 
a passenger-seating configuration of 9 seats or less by revising the 
definitions of ``commuter operation'' and ``on demand operation'' in 
Sec. 119.3. Therefore, scheduled operations in airplanes with a 
passenger-seating configuration of 9 or less (except turbojets) and 
conducted on a particular route with a frequency of fewer than five 
round trips per week (regardless of whether one or more airplanes are 
used on the route) would be conducted under the requirements applicable 
to on-demand operations.
    The FAA believes that, because of the nature of the operation in 
which small turbojets, which are type certificated under part 25, are 
used (e.g., transoceanic, long range, international, etc.), they 
approximate the operations of larger air carriers. For example, part 
135 contains no requirements for long-range navigational equipment or 
long-range fuel considerations. In an effort to increase the safety for 
passengers carried in those kinds of operations, the FAA has determined 
that any scheduled operations of turbojet airplanes should be conducted 
under part 121.
    The FAA disagrees with commenters who suggest that commuter 
operations in code-sharing arrangements should be conducted under the 
rules for supplemental operations. Code-sharing, although it may affect 
passengers' perceptions, is a business/marketing arrangement and is not 
the basis for an FAA regulatory scheme. Scheduled operations in 
airplanes with 10 or more passenger seats should come under part 121 
domestic or flag, as appropriate, not under supplemental rules.
    The only operators who currently operate under part 135 on-demand 
rules that would be required to conduct their operations under part 121 
scheduled rules are those who are included because, as discussed above, 
part 121 does not contain a frequency of operation provision. If 
circumstances in the future necessitate a change to these rules, 
commenters will have an opportunity to comment on any proposed changes.
    Air Tour Industry Comments: Several comments were received from air 
tour operators in the State of Nevada and the vicinity of the Grand 
Canyon. Some of these certificate holders would be affected by the 
rulemaking because they operate nontransport category airplanes of 10 
to 19 seats and because they provide point-to-point service; for 
example, from Las Vegas to Grand Canyon Airport even though the flights 
are exclusively marketed as sightseeing and not point-to-point travel. 
Despite the fact that they technically fall into the category of a 
commuter operator, these commenters claim that they are more like an 
on-demand operator and that the proposed rule would penalize them for 
using larger, safer airplanes than their competitors. One of these 
commenters states that it does not fly city to city, but flies 
regularly scheduled flights that take off and land at the same airport. 
This operator states that, because of the nature of the operation and 
because of the proposed definition changes, it would be required to 
comply as a scheduled operator.
    According to the commenters, since they have upgraded from 6- to 9-
seat airplanes to 19-seat airplanes, they have been required to install 
ground proximity warning systems (GPWS), traffic alert and collision 
avoidance systems (TCAS), cockpit voice recorders (CVR), and flight 
data recorders (FDR), while their competitors have not been burdened by 
these costs. According to some of these commenters, this equipment is 
not beneficial in their operating environment because they typically 
fly in VFR conditions on short-range flights of an hour or less.
    The commenters complain that if the proposed rule is implemented, 
they will be forced to replace the turboprop airplanes with smaller 
reciprocating-powered planes and will thereby lose some significant 
safety benefits such as the following:
     The two-pilot crew requirement with captains required to 
hold an Air Transport Pilot rating.
     Aircraft certificated to higher levels of aircraft 
performance.
     Aircraft maintenance procedures under the more 
comprehensive Continuous Airworthiness Maintenance Program.
     Safety equipment such as GPWS, TCAS, CVR, and weather 
radar.
    One commenter lists some of the more ``onerous'' proposed 
requirements:
     ``Ditchable'' exits in case of water landings.
     Emergency floor path exits.
     Third attitude indicator (in aircraft flown in daylight 
under visual flight rules).
     Portable protective breathing equipment (PBE).
    A commenter points out that the new aircraft performance 
requirements would limit maximum operating weight at Grand Canyon due 
to the high altitude.
    According to these commenters, switching to smaller airplanes will 
increase air traffic congestion in the Grand Canyon area, decrease 
safety for passengers, and double or triple noise levels.
    According to one commenter, these certificate holders do not have 
code-sharing partners and while these certificate holders sometimes 
provide point-to-point service, the flights are typically part of an 
all-inclusive tour package which includes ground transfers to Las Vegas 
hotels, sightseeing flights to the Grand Canyon, and motor coach tours 
of the Grand Canyon. This is totally unlike typical commuter 
operations.
    Another commenter, however, says that at least one of the air tour 
operators does use code-sharing with a major carrier and that the 
offering of its scheduled flights is available by referencing airline 
computers all over the world.
    Some of the commenters cite an NTSB report (``Safety of the Air 
Tour Industry in the United States,'' June 1, 1995) which states that 
the implementation of SFAR 50-2 has created a safe operating 
environment for air tour operators over the Grand Canyon. One commenter 
quotes NTSB as saying, ``The level of safety of air tour operations 
could be improved by creating a national standard for air tour 
operations that contains definitions specific to the air tour industry 
and specific requirements, including unique operations specifications, 
to accommodate localized unique conditions, similar to the special 
conditions contained in SFAR 50-2.''
    One commenter states that his company recruits retired airline 
pilots to provide a high level of experience and stability to the 
flightcrews.
    The Clark County Board of Aviation is concerned that the proposed 
rule could be devastating to individual certificate holders and 
adversely affect the vitality of the air tour industry in Southern 
Nevada. The Grand Canyon Air Tour Council states that the proposed expanded 
definition of ``scheduled operations'' is the problem and that the 
definition was changed with no satisfactory explanation or 
justification.
    The Office of the Lieutenant Governor of Nevada testified at the 
public meeting held in Las Vegas that compliance would affect a ``$250 
million industry that we have worked hard to develop.''
    FAA Response: The FAA does not agree that air tour operations are 
totally unlike commuter operations. Much of an air tour flight is like 
much of a commuter flight. If an air tour operator is conducting 
scheduled operations, as defined in Sec. 119.3, in airplanes with a 
passenger-seating configuration of 10 or more, it must comply with part 
121 domestic or flag requirements, as applicable. This includes 
operators who fly from and return to the same point on a scheduled 
basis.
    The FAA agrees that certain aspects of air tour operations make 
them appear to be unlike commuter operations. For example, portions of 
air tour flights are at lower altitudes, typically over rugged and 
remote terrain, and often in airspace that is congested with other 
sightseeing aircraft. The FAA has begun an air tour industry project to 
study the implications of these differences to safety and to develop 
regulations, as necessary, to address specific features of air tour 
operations. If regulations are implemented as a result of the project, 
they would be in addition to current regulations, as is SFAR 50-2 which 
prescribes requirements for special conditions relating to flights over 
the Grand Canyon. The FAA project will consider the recent NTSB study 
cited by commenters. Because certain part 121 and 135 provisions are 
being recodified into part 119, SFAR 50-2 and SFAR 71 are being updated 
to conform to this rulemaking.
    Alaskan Comments: Several comments were received from certificate 
holders in Alaska, Alaska government agencies, and others interested in 
how the proposal will affect Alaskan operations. Currently Alaskan 
certificate holders conducting scheduled operations in airplanes of 10 
to 30 seats comply with part 135. The regulations allow them not to 
comply with flight time limitations for scheduled operations 
(Sec. 135.261(b) and (c)) and instead allow them to follow the 
regulations for on-demand operations. Alaskan certificate holders using 
airplanes of more than 30 seats must comply with part 121 supplemental 
requirements for nonscheduled flights and flag requirements for 
international and intra-Alaska scheduled operations. Notice No. 95-5 
proposed no exceptions for Alaska. Certificate holders whose operations 
fit the applicability for scheduled operations for airplanes of 10 or 
more seats would be required to comply with part 121 domestic 
requirements. International operations would follow flag requirements 
of part 121 and charter operations would follow supplemental 
requirements of part 121. Alaskan operators currently operating under 
part 121 flag rules would have to operate under part 121 domestic rules 
except for those operations that meet the definition of flag operations 
in proposed Sec. 119.3.
    The basic thrust of the comments is that the Alaska environment is 
unique and that requiring Alaskan commuter operators to comply with 
part 121 requirements would be devastating to certain certificate 
holders in Alaska and therefore to certain segments of air 
transportation. Furthermore commenters point out that most air 
transportation in Alaska is conducted in small reciprocating-powered 
airplanes with passenger-seating capacities of under 10 seats. 
Therefore, the proposed rule would not have a significant effect on air 
transportation safety in Alaska and would impose an economic burden on 
a few certificate holders who provide upgraded, i.e., safer, service. 
According to commenters, the accident rate for airplanes with under 10 
seats is much higher than for turbine-powered airplanes with 19 seats. 
(Accident data analyzed by the FAA verifies that, unlike the rest of 
the nation, the part of the commuter fleet in Alaska involved in 
accidents contains a large proportion of under-10-seat aircraft.)
    Peninsula Airways (Penair), as well as other commenters, states 
that characteristics of Alaska make commuter operations in the State 
unlike those in other parts of the country. In particular flights are 
conducted in the same time zone, pilots do not have long commutes to 
their jobs, flights are not usually conducted between 9 p.m. and 7 
a.m., and operations subject to Air Traffic Control (ATC) are not in 
congested airspace. This rationale is primarily in defense of using the 
flight time limit requirements of part 135 nonscheduled operations.
    Several commenters emphasize the absolute necessity of air travel 
in Alaska where many of the towns and villages are not accessible by 
road. They say that Alaskans are dependent on air transportation and 
the cost of that transportation must remain affordable. High cost items 
in the proposal, such as the possible need to upgrade airports, the use 
of a dispatch system, the various equipment requirements, and certain 
performance requirements, would boost the fares to levels that many 
residents of Alaska could not afford. The State of Alaska Department of 
Transportation and Public Facilities states that ``the proposed air 
carrier and airport regulations could devastate Alaska's heavily 
aviation dependent economy.''
    The Alaska Air Carriers Association (AACA) states that the proposed 
rule would end the growth of the 10- to 19-seat airplane and would 
increase fares by 67 to 100 percent. The proposed airport legislation 
is expected to cost the state $100 million. AACA states that the 
proposed rule would directly affect only 15 certificate holders in 
Alaska. Two-thirds of the scheduled air carriers use aircraft with a 
seating capacity of 10 seats or less.
    ERA Aviation, which currently operates under part 121 flag rules, 
objects to the proposal to operate as domestic/supplemental. It 
operates over 100 aircraft, fixed and rotary wing, nationally and 
internationally. The commenter states that for years Alaska part 121 
operators have been operating under flag rules, both for scheduled and 
nonscheduled operations. This has allowed increased flexibility in crew 
scheduling, which is necessary because of the length of Alaska routes, 
the lack of facilities in remote locations, and the lack of road 
networks or other alternate forms of transportation to outlying 
communities. Section 119.21 would require these carriers to operate 
under domestic rules, which would decrease crew scheduling flexibility, 
add substantially to costs, derogate safety, and probably result in the 
elimination of vital air transportation services to some outlying 
communities. The commenter says there is no safety justification for 
such a change because Alaska part 121 operators have established an 
excellent safety record under existing rules. They say that, at the 
very least, Alaska carriers currently operating under flag rules should 
be allowed to continue to operate under flag rules for both scheduled 
and nonscheduled operations.
    A part of the proposal that would have affected several Alaskan 
certificate holders is the proposal that single-engine airplanes with 
10 passenger seats now operating scheduled flights under part 135 would 
in effect have to remove a seat in order to continue operating in 
scheduled service under part 135. Single-engine airplanes are 
ineligible for operation under part 121. The only 10-seat single-engine 
airplane model involved is the single-engine de Haviland DHC-3 Otter 
(not to be confused with the twin-engine de Haviland DHC-6 Twin Otter 
mentioned elsewhere in this notice). According to AACA and other commenters, 
there is no possible safety benefit in taking a seat out of an 
airplane, but the cost to certificate holders who want to continue to 
use these airplanes in scheduled operations will be significant.
    NATA comments that no accident involving the Otter would have been 
prevented by limiting the seating to 9 passengers. Furthermore, 
according to the commenter, the FAA cost on this issue is another 
example of gross underestimation; actual costs will be 15 times higher 
(almost $22,000 per aircraft). The City and Bureau of Juneau opposes 
the proposal to remove a seat from the 10-seat airplanes so that they 
can operate under part 135. This commenter notes that there will be 
additional flights, additional noise, and additional congestion on the 
water and in the air. It notes that it is incomprehensible how the 
reduction of one seat from the Otter will provide an additional level 
of safety. Wings of Alaska comments that the most cost-efficient 
floatplane used in southeast Alaska is the single-engine DHC-3 Otter. 
Because there is no cost-effective replacement aircraft available for 
float operations that offers the same capacity as the Otter, replacing 
them is not an option. Wings states that it operates the Otter about 6 
months a year. Four communities that do not have runways receive daily 
service. Wings purchased five 10-seat Otters in '92-93 to improve 
service to a wilderness sports facility, substantially reducing noise 
by reducing the number of flights by 50%. Wings notes that considering 
initial operating experience (IOE) and route check requirements, it is 
being operated at a higher level of safety than the 10 seat, on-demand 
aircraft allowed under the rule to be operated in part 135. Wings 
estimates that the removal of one seat would have cost them $85,000 in 
1994. Wings asks that the Cessna Caravan and the Cessna Grand Caravan 
also be allowed to operate with 10 seats. AACA comments that Ketchikan 
Air Service, Taquan Air Service, and Wings of Alaska together operate 
12 Otters in southeastern Alaska.
    The NTSB comments that it intentionally excluded airlines that 
operate exclusively in Alaska from its study of commuter airline safety 
because of the unique characteristics of the environment in Alaska. The 
NTSB currently is conducting a study of commercial Alaska aviation 
including commuter airlines. The NTSB held two public meetings in 
Alaska during June 1995 and visited a number of scheduled and 
nonscheduled part 135 certificate holders to collect information for 
the study. The NTSB intends to compare flying operations in Alaska with 
the rest of the U.S. The study is scheduled for completion in 1995. 
Several other commenters mention the study and suggest that the FAA 
should wait until the study is completed before making any changes to 
Alaskan regulations.
    ALPA, GAMA, and other commenters state that safety issues are the 
same in or out of Alaska and that, therefore, Alaska should not be 
given a blanket exemption from the rulemaking. ALPA and GAMA state that 
Alaskan certificate holders, as well as certificate holders in other 
parts of the country, may need to be exempted from certain requirements 
that are not applicable to the type of operations being conducted and 
should go through the standard exemption request procedures in such 
cases.
    One comment from an individual pilot in Alaska states that the 
schedule he flies of 14 days on and 14 days off is exhausting, and that 
even though he gets 10 hours of rest in each 24 hours, it is not enough 
over a 14-day period. He is in favor of the proposed flight time limit 
changes.
    Some Alaskan certificate holders comment that they rely on 
experienced pilots who are familiar with the particular demands of 
Alaskan operations. Penair states that 10 percent of its pilots are age 
60 or over and that 20 percent are over age 52.
    Commenters who oppose the rule suggest either exempting Alaska 
altogether, not including the 10-to-19 seat airplanes in the rule, or 
allowing under-19-seat airplanes to be covered under the supplemental 
rules of part 121 rather than the domestic rules.
    FAA Response: The FAA agrees with the commenters who state that 
safety issues are the same in or out of Alaska. The FAA has 
specifically considered the implications of the proposal on Alaska 
given its unique characteristics and has determined that the rules 
should apply to Alaska as proposed. While the NTSB comment on Notice 
95-5 states that the NTSB excluded Alaska from its safety study on 
commuter airlin